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THE INFLATION IN THE EARLY MEIJI ERA 
- History of Inflation in Japan-
By Motokazu SHINDO* 
Forewod 
Chapter 1. Condition of the Circulation of Paper Money beror the 
Tenth Year of Meiji or 1877. 
Chapter 2. Causes of the Inflation and Various Phenomena con" 
sequent upon It. 
Chapter 3. Measures taken by the Government to counter the 
Inflation. 
Chapter 4. Limi ts of the Inflation and its Control. 
FOREWORD 
The subject of the present treatise is the inflation during the 1878-
1881 period. The treatise has been undertaken with the desire that a frui-
tless theoretical study on the part of the present writer be forestalled by 
endeavoring to examine its history (a history of a reality controlled by 
various conditions peculiar to each of these years under review). In this 
essay, the writer, focussing his effort on the reality, (1) examining in the 
light of the reality the essential form of the inflation which he has grasped 
and (2) proving the decisive importance of clearly grasping the essential 
form of the inflation, has tried to examine the various phenomena con-
sequent upon the inflation and the counter measures taken by the govern-
ment then in power to meet its effect. The present writer is confident 
that the present treatise has also made a passing allusion to the position the 
inflation occupied with regard to the government policy. 
Chapter 1. Condition of the Circulation of 
Paper Money before 1877 
Following the collapse of the Tokugawa feudalism, the new Meiji 
government, as an absolutist regime, while firmly establishing itself, started 
its advance conscious of the historical mission to forcibly realise an essen-
* The author is lecturer of Economics at Nagasaki University. 
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tial accumulation of capital (die ursprilngliche Akkumnlation des Kapitals). 
Such historical mission invariably conditioned the monetary system in force 
in the early Meiji era. In other words, while the execution of such mission 
required a large amount of financial fund, its preparation had to be made 
mainly issuing inconvertible notes, and this invariably entailed a successive 
issuance of four categories of notes, including the Dajokan notes, which, 
incidentally, ushered in the disorder seen in the monetary system in the 
early Meiji era. These notes issued by the still embryonic regime, ever 
threatened by a major opposing force, inevitably lacked a compulsory 
power to make them circulate. Among these, the Dajokan notes, in 
spite of various steps taken by the government intended for their forcible 
circulation, even showed a decline in value of more than 60% against the 
specie. This situation, however, was soon ameliorated as the government 
dispensed with the absolute compulsory measures and shifted to such!) 
which followed the unbiased economic rules (1872). This was given a 
further impetus by the drastic reform to replace the feudalistic regional 
clans with modern prefectures (1871), for, the government, now finding 
itself in a position to assert an undisputed nationwide supremacy, hasten-
ed to issue a new unified currency Shinshihei (1872), in which the afore-
mentioned four different currencies were gradually absorbed. This ope-
ned the way for a readjustment of the monetary system; up to 1877 
after this, the paper money issued by the central government were able 
to enjoy a stability, as witness the decline to I yen (in June) in 1876 from 
1.051 yen (in February) in 1875, at maximum, of the difference with the 
silver money, as seen in terms of the price of silver when quoted on the 
market. 
Besides such paper money, there also were the banknotes convertible 
into the specie, which were issued by the government on the basis of the 
Act of National Bank (promulgated in 1872) designed to effect a readjust-
ment of government notes and an essential accumulation of capital. Ho-
wever, this specific category of notes could not be issued indefinitely under 
the pressure of the successive unfavorable balance of foreign trade and of 
1) By the ordinance of M.ay 1869, the government promised to exchange this note wid: 
specie duri.ng five years and to pay 6 percent interest a year to those which will have not 
been exchanged in the above years. Incidentally, the time for it expired at 1872, the go-
vernment could not practtce the promise. By the ordinance of 1872 and 1873, Dajokan 
notes was determined to exchange with a loan (Kimatsuhikikae-KiJsai.Sh6sho) and in practice it 
was mainly exchanged with new paper money (Shinshihei). cf. Shiheiseiri-Shimalsu-h6koku.--
A Report by Count'M. Matsukata on the monetary system in the early Meiji era. (in: 'Meiji 
Zenki Zaisei- Keizai Shiryo Shusei.-Collected Materiats on public Finance and Econmy 
in the Early Mejji era, Vol. 11), p. 193 
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the flow abroad of gold and silver caused by the sharp fluctuation in the 
comparative price of gold and silver, and, thus, the amount of these notes 
actually in circulation was simply negligible up till 1876. 
Chapter 2. Causes of the Inflation and Various 
Phenomena consequent upon It 
Now, it is noted that the new paper money steadily tended to be 
issued in an increased amount as they were generally expended to cover 
the extemporaneous national revenue deficit as well as to meet the expenses 
by the Board for the Development of the Hokkaido, in addition to the role 
it served as a fund disposable by the exchange bank, which, incidentally, 
offered an impetus to a subsequent inflation. On the other hand, reca-
lcitrant elements among the fallen Samurai classes resorted to a succession 
of open revolt against the central government in 1876 and 1877. The 
Kumamoto district saw the rebellion started by a local ultra-feudalistic 
organisation kno'NTI as the Keishinto, while similar revolts successively occ-
urred in Yamaguchi and Chiba. These eventually culminated in the ma-
jor rebellion by the followers of Takamori Saig6 in January, 1877. The 
inflation registered after 1878 evidently was caused by such factors as me-
ntioned earlier, while it should be noted that the need faced by the central 
government to prepare war funds to cover the expedition to Kyushu to 
place the rebellious situation there under control gave further and more 
direct impetus to the intensification of the inflationary trends. Endeavour 
will be made in the following lines to clarify the reasons why this parti-
cular necessity faced by the Tokyo government asserted itself as the imme-
diate factor responsible for the upsurge of the subsequent inflation. 
Towards the end of the year 1876, the national bonds issued amounted 
to Yen 53,000,000 in total, while, for the following year, 1877, additional 
issue of national bonds amounting to Yen 170,000,000 was under schedule. 
Under the circumstance, it was simply evident that the preparation of 
the necessary war funds by asking the nation to absorb such high amount 
of national bonds was out of question because they could not simply 
afford it. In view of this, the government had no other alternative than 
resorting to the following procedures to attain the purposes so urgent at 
the moment: 
(a) Loan from the 15th Bank. To clarify the circumstances in this 
connection, it would be necessary to refer to the revision effected in 1876 
of the Act of National Bank. It has already been mentioned that the issue 
of National Bank notes had to face an enormous difficulty, and that their 
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circulation was possible only on an extremely limited scale. If this situa-
tion was to be interpreted as the economic factors necessitating such revi-
sion of the Act of National Bank, equivalent political factors should also 
be found in the measures taken by the government to compensate for the 
financial losses suffered by the erstwhile all-powerful Samurai and other 
privileged classes as a sequel to the collapse of the Shogunate feudalism. 
The compensation was to be effected in the form of loan (Kinroku-Kosai) 
delivered to these elements in exchange of what they had been deprived 
of. Apprehensive of the unavoidable unrest duly expectable on the heels 
of the decline of such government-issued expedient loan, the government 
had to resort to such revision with a view to mobilizing them for the 
ranks of the newly-rising capitalistic production machinery. I) According 
to the revised provisions, the bonds would be eligible to be mortgaged 
for banknotes, the reserves for which were to be found in government-
issued paper notes instead of the gold specie as heretofore. With the revi-
sion as a turning point, Tomomi Iwakura, one of the two deputy premiers 
at the time, and his follower-peers ventured to take steps for the inaugura-
tion of the 15th Bank (Jugo Ginko). The time coincided with the outbreak 
of the Southwestern Rebellion (i. e. rebellion by Takamori Saigo and his 
followers in Kylishii) and the government faced an acute need of financing 
the government expeditionary forces sent to Kylishii to subjugate the revolt. 
The government, under the pressure of the circumstance, hastened to issue 
the provisional certificates in place of the full-fledged compensation bonds, 
to pave the way for the projected inauguration of the bank in question, 
from which a sum of Yen 15,000,000 out of the total amount of paper 
notes issued was loaned at a low interest rate (5 % per annum), and in 
return for which the peerage became the recipients of various special pri-
vileges. 
(b) Financial contributions by Sakai Prefecture (now defunct). These 
amounted to Yen 100,000. 
(c) Increased issue of government paper notes. An amount of Yen 
27,000,000 was issued out of the new paper notes prepared to be exchanged 
for the deformed notes. 
By these means, the government managed to have available a sum of 
1) s. Okuma, the Minister of Finance, said, "The Government determined to issue shortly 
the Kinroku-Kosai.Shosho.······If we now revise the Act of National Bank, and give per· 
mission to establish banks on the basis of this Sh6sho, its price will not fall as it can use 
to good advantage. Consequently, the Samurai and other priviledged classes can save from 
the distress-" .... " cf. Kasei-Koyo.--Materials on the Money and Monetary Policy in the 
early Meiji era. (in: Meiji zenki Zaisei.Keizai shiryo shllsei Vol. 13) p. 465 
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Yen 42,000,000 for war expenditures, in addition to which a little over 
Yen 8,000,000 was also available in the form of the appropriated notes 
issued between January and February, 1878. This made the total Yen 
50,000,000. Thus, the war funds to finance the Kyiishii expedition were 
prepared entirely on the basis of inconvertible paper money, which were 
never backed by any tangible value and which were nothing more than 
a "pure demand for social products". The situation prevailing then rela-
tive to the circulation of paper money is indicated in Table 1. 
Table I (Un;t Yen 1,000) 
Items !I New Money I Category 1 Appropria· Bank Total 
, government ted paper notes 
Years 
, 
',I i paper notes notes 
1873 1 53,878 I 97,614 1 912 152,345 
1874 I 52,566 96,556 I 822 149,926 
1875 
I 
45,848 101,554 327 147,637 
1876 47,700 105.880 1,684 155,233 
1877 -
I 








114,190 16, 118 33, 752 164,354 
1880 , - 108,412 16,528 34,398 159,366 
1881 i - I 105, 905 13,000 34,375 153, 302 
Notes: (1) The figures in the Table are as on the last day of December, 
except the Bank notes, of which a monthly average for Dece· 
m ber is given. 
(2) The totals shown for the years after 1877 include government 
paper notes and bank notes only. 
Now, it is obvious that in any study of inflation, an investigation of 
the relationship existing between the actual amount of the circulation of 
paper money and the necessary amount of money should serve as the star-
ting point. Thus, the question presents itself of what relationship these 
inconvertible notes generally issued under government authority had with 
the necessary amount of the circulation of money. To quote Count Ma-
sayoshi Matsukata, who then occupied the portfolio of Finance Minister, 
the" adequate amount of paper notes to be circulated in Japan was to be 
found in the figure actually registered in 1877, i. e. approximately Yen 
100,000,000, and it should be known that at the addition of every Yen 
10,000,000 above this, there would inevitably be registered a difference of 
10 Sen." Whether Count Matsukata was really right when he declared that 
the adequate amount of paper money in circulation in the years immedia-
tely prior to the advent of the inflationary trends should, evidently, be 
open to question, and attempt will be made in the following lines to clarify 
this particular point, at the same that an analytical examination be made 
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to see what such adequate amount of circulation really was. A hint, in 
this connection, will be found in the existence, if ever, of a difference 
between the value of the standard money and the paper notes and in the 
commodity price level then prevailing. According to Table I, as shown 
above, the total amount of money in circulation in the 1873-1876 period 
was approximately Yen 150,000,000, of which about Yen 100,000,000 was 
occupied by paper note. The difference between the value of the silver 
and paper notes (substantially Japan, then, was on the silver standard) 
was, as has already been mentioned earlier, below 5 Sen in the 1876-1876 
period, and, in June, 1976, any such difference ceased to show. The price 
index, placing that of 1873 at 100, stood at 102, in 1874, 105 in 1875 and 
101 in 1876, showing fractional fluctuations. From this it may be concluded 
with a certain certainty that the level of Yen 150,000,000 was the amo-
unt of ciruclation adequately meeting the necessary amount of the cir-
culation of money at that time, which proves that the afore-said statement 
of Count Matsukata about the Yen 100,000,000 level indicated the ade-
quate amount of circulation of paper money at that time. 
Thus, it will be seen easily that all additional issuance amount to 
Yen 50,000,000 in inconvertible notes with no tangible value backing, at 
a time when the necessary amount of the circulation of money was on 
such a level as mentioned above, was obviously in excess of that level. 
The popular theory has it that, when the actual circulating amount of 
inconvertible notes is in excess of the necesarry amount of the circnlation 
of money, entailing a "decline" in the value of the notes, an inflation 
does set in. This, however, should not be considered correct. If this inter-
pretation is upheld, as Professor T. Okahashi (KyusyU University) once cle-
arly pointed out, the tendency for such" decline" to be fixed under infla-
tion would not be explained out because the "decline" in value of the 
paper notes merely as a measns of circulation should naturally be void of 
a tendency to be fixed as is the "decline" of the money (gold) formally 
stipulated as a means of circulation. On the other hand, there is no doubt 
that the tendency of the fixation of " decline" in value as reflected in the , 
continuation for a reasonable period of time of a general rise of com-
modity prices offers an unmistakable sign of an inflation. In the second 
place, such a theory would amount to a virtual denial of the nominal 
character of the rise of commodity prices under inflation. Such upward 
trend of prices caused by the loss of balance between supply and demand 
as the actual amount of paper note circulation exceeds the necessary amount 
of the circulation of money, in the long run, will become a substantial 
rise influenced by the variation of value. Lastly, such theory will unavoida-
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bly work to deny the very "decline" in value, and, in its train, the very 
inflation, for such will bring about an unbalance between supply and 
demand, an increase in the value of commodities, the disappearance of 
the difference between the value of a commodity and its market price, 
an equalization between 1 yen of money (gold) and 1 yen of paper notes, 
and, hence, the ceasing of such "decline" in value. The error of such 
popularly-accepted theory should be found in its failure to take due cog-
nizance of the problem of the price standard. The essential feature of an 
inflation should be sought in the effect of the circulation of inconvertible 
notes in excess of the necessary amount of the circulation of money leading 
to a cutting down of the price standard. In other words, an increased issuance 
of paper notes in excess of the necessary amount of the circulation of 
money will inevitably lead to a decrease of gold amount represented by 
it and the virtual (or economic) cutting down of the price standard, which 
results in the fixation of the "decline" in value and the nominal rise of 
commodity prices. For instance, when the price standard is cut down 
substantially (or economically) to half of what it previously was, the com-
modity, which stood at par, say, with 1 yen in gold coin, will become to 
be exchanged for 2 yen in paper note, and, therefore, unless an additional 
issuance of paper notes is seen, there will be found no factors leading to 
further fluctuation in the commodity price, and, thus, the commodity price 
will inevitably be stabilized and fixed on this level. Further, in this case, 
as there has occurred no change in the commodity value and the money 
value, such rise in commodity price should be seen as merely nominal. 
The inflation, therefore, must be understand the problem of the function 
of the money of account. Thus, an examination of the virtual, and, hence, 
economic decline of the price standard at that time poses a problem to 
be examined. As Japan then was on a silver standard as a matter of fact, 
the currency to function as a price standard was, naturally, silver. In 1877, 
a silver coin of 1 yen denomination contained 6.520500 momme of silver. 
As, against ¥ 150,000,000 -the necessary amount of the circulation of 
money- an additional ¥ 50,000,000 was placed in circulation without 
being backed by any value relationship, the amount of silver represented 
in a paper note of 1 yen denomination was reduced to 4.890375 momme, 
which is to say that the price standard, substantially, was cut down by 25%.0 
The foregoing lines, thus, have amply made it clear that the method 
I) This is calculated as follows. 6.520500 x 150000000=978075000 momme 
978075000+200000000=4.890375 momme 6.520500-4.890375 = 1.630125 momme 
1.630125+6.520500 = 25(%) 
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adopted by the government in raising the funds needed for financing the 
1877 rebellion in Kyiishii was the immediate cause for the inflation witnessed 
in the years after 1878. In the lines to follow, various phenomena asserting 
themselves under this inflation will be brought up for examination. 
Among a number of commodity prices, the price of rice and that of 
silver registered a most marked rise. (Refer Table II). The factors causing 
such rise of rice price would be found not only in the effect of the infla-
tion then prevailing but also in the fluctuation of its market price through 
the unbalance brought in the supply and demand due to the fact that the 
rice crops, except in the years 1877-1881 were below the average annual 
level, and, to the same extent, in the prevalence of speculation at the rice 
exchange. The rise of rice price at this period was interpreted by a cer-
tain authority in the following vein: "As in 1877 indications were evident 
in the quarters concerned that the land taxes would be lowered, the eco-
nomic situation of the farming household was much improved. In the 
years following 1787, the rice price continued to rise; the farmer had only 
to put on sale half of his crops to garner more than what he would have 
earned ordinarily, which, naturally, resulted in a full-ranged improvement 
of the economic life of the farmer, and the additional financial profits 
--------------~_ Year I 
Item !
Price of rice 
Index, price of rice 
Index, of Tokyo 
major commodities 
Excess imports 
Excess im ports .from 
gold-standard countries 
Flow of gold specie 
Price of paper note per 
1 yen silver coin 



























',267 6, 139 9,644 [I 
yen I 1.033 1.099 1.2121 
1880 1881 
1 
10.47 ; 10.49 
203 203 
130 136 





I. 4771 I. 696 
Per I.yen II 
~btt ! 
3.8.5 3. II. 8 3. 9. 5 3. 8. I Ii 3. 8. 9 
shilling 
World ratio of gold and pe:;:inst I· ! I 
silver price gold 1 i _________ --e ___ I'_._22-L __ 1_'_. 9_4_'I'--__ 1_8·_4O--'-i ___ 18_._05 __ : __ 1_8_. _16_
1 
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Table III. 
A B C D 
Cases of Ratio by Ratio by Ratio by 
inspection average price reduced tax average 
relative to of rice of in 1877 & price of 
land tax 1874·75·76 price of rice of 
reform rice in 1878 1878·1887 
State 34 % 13 12 11.5 
Landowner 34 % 55 56 56.5 
Tenant 
farmer 32 % 32 32 32 
Total 100 % 100 100 100 
thus gained by him were presumably turned to the purchase of imported 
foreign goods." Superficially, it would seem that the rise of rice price 
benefited the entire farming populace; but, such view is completely er-
roneous. According to Table III, which shows the ratio of shares to the 
tenant farmer of the entire range of agricultural labor products, it is evi-
dent that more than a half of them was for the acquisition of landlords, 
which registered a steady increase. As D shows the ratio by average price 
of rice of 1878-1887, when the drastic rise of rice price after 1878 and its 
sudden fall after 18821) is taken into consideration, it would be presumed 
that what was acquired by the landlords under inflation was much more 
than what is indicated above. On the contrary, the farmer had to turn 
to consumption of his family a major part of what he could acquire, while 
what he had to purchase registered a continued rise in price. If this is 
taken into consideration, it would even be said that the economic condi-
tion of the farmer deteriorated rather than was improved. Such advantage 
which was being enjoyed by the landlord is eloquently indicated, further, 
in the increase from 31.10 % in 1873 to 36.75 % in 1883 of the percentage 
of the tenant farm area compared to the total tilled land. Accordingly, 
the landlords exclusively gained by the rise of rice price, and they purcha-
sed the imported foreign goods by their surplus purchasing power. 
Again, with regard to the rise of the silver price, Count Mastukata 
further said that" in the years 1880 and 1881, when the value of paper 
note was at its lowest ebb, the amount of circulation stood at between 
¥ 170,000,000 and ¥ 180,000,000, the market price of which was between 
¥ 1.70 and ¥ 1.80. Viewed in this way, the paper money amounted to 
¥ 70,000,000-¥ 80,000,000 excess over ¥ 100,000,000, which was the ade-
1) Yen 8.76 in 1882, Yen 6.08 in 1883, Yen 5.37 in 1884, Yen 6.90 in 1885. cf. Sh;heiseiri· 
shimatsu-h6koku, p. 246-7 
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quate amount of circulation, was allowably to be called a shadow of the 
currency actually in circulation··· .... " This view would be held as correct 
if the necessary amount of the circulation of money in 1877 actually co-
incided with Matsukata as the adequate amount of the circulation of paper 
money. However, the fact stands that both fail to coincide, the former as 
has already been made clear, standing at ¥ 150,000,000, and, thefefore, 
the mathematical explanation offered here by Count Matsukata does not 
hold good. It has earlier been pointed out that the virtual cutting 
down of the price standard caused by the increased issuance of inconver-
tible paper notes amounted to 25 %, and, thus, the ratio of rise registered 
in the price of silver may be computed as follows. Now, if the amount 
of silver contained in a ¥ I silver coin is put at a momme, the amount of 
silver equivalent to ¥ I after a virtual cutting down of the price standard 
h Id b h b 100-25 A h· f·1 b b s ou e sown y 100 a. s t IS amount 0 SI ver ecomes to e 
indicated as ¥ I, assuming the role of a virtual price standard, the fol-
lowing equation should show to how much. yen the a momme amount of 
silver corresponds: 
a: 100-25 a=X: I 100 
Y = 1.33 (yen) 
75 I =]jj() X 
Thus, it is known that the old ¥ I silver coin, due to a virtual cutting 
down of the price standard, now actually amounts to ¥ 1.33. According 
to Table II, the price of paper note as against a ¥ I silver coin registered 
\" 1.477 in 1881 and ¥ 1.696 in 1882 (the highest level was reached in 
April the same year with ¥ 1,795). Although this shows a slight diver-
gence from what the afore-mentioned equation would produce, this should 
be construed as the result brought about, due to the continued adverse 
trade balance under inflation as alluded to hereafter, by an increased 
demand for silver constituting the standard money as well as by the in-
tense speculation centered on silver. Shigenobu Okuma, the then Finance 
Minister, in his report to the Premier urging the need of inaugurating a 
central exchange for the transaction of foreign silver, (or Mexicandollars), 
pointed out that "thorough investigations conducted by the government 
authorities concerned······have established that the current situation has 
for the most part been brought about by bogus transactions. Of late not 
only those firms which have hitherto had transaction in foreign silver do 
business in this but also those who, like mere errand boys, have not even 
one sen at immediate disposal, do eagerly compete in transacting in this, 
so much so that the amount of bogus transactions thus conducted by day 
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stands well above one million dollars on an average." Now, it would be 
worth special attention that the fundamental causes responsible for the rise 
of the prices of rice and silver should be found in the cutting down of 
the price standard effected through an increased issuance of inconvertible 
paper notes. The failure to take this duly in sight was, as is explained 
later, responsible for the blunders witnessed in the government counter-
measures resorted to in order to overcome the contemporary inflation. 
Now, according to the general commodity price index in Tokyo, the 
actual rate of the rise of the commodity prices was roughly on the same 
level with the rate of commodity price rise theoretically computed from 
the virtual (or economic) rate of cutting down of the price standard (this 
rate may be computed by the same equation as in the case of the new 
price of a momme of silver resulting from the cutting down of the price sta-
ndard, as mentioned earlier. The rate of rise was 33%), and this fact 
deserves due attention. (Refer Table II), 
Meanwhile, Japan's foreign trade was showing a chronic unfavorable 
balance (Refer Table II). This phenomenon could be traced to the high 
level of commodity prices prevailing in the country due to the prevalence 
of inflation and also to the tendency that the increased purchasing power 
af land-owners and others benefiting from the inflation was utilized for 
the importation of foreign goods. 
The rate of exchange likewise was registering a steady fall every year. 
(Refer Table II). Fundamentally, the exchange transactions are none other 
than capital loaning operations, which, as a matter of fact, accompany 
payment of interest. Further, if a bank takes part in the transactions, a 
market interest will be added to it. Therefore, the actual demand rate 
of exchange will be determined by three factors of capital loaned and 
exchange interest plus market interest against the term involved. A study 
of the continued fall of the rate of exchange, with the above circumstance 
duly taken into consideration, will easily point to two causes working for 
such decline. Firstly, the virtual (or economic) cutting down of the price 
standard led to a nominal rise of commodity prices, which, in turn, resulted 
in an unfavorable balance in the payment of the differences, for the set-
tlement of which demand for foreign exchange registered a sharp increase, 
which, again, saw a sharp rise in the negative interest paid. The second 
cause would be found in the fluctuation in the comparative price of gold 
and silver. Now, it is noted that, on the world market, the price of silver 
began to show a decline from about 1875 following the adoption by Ger-
many (in 1873) of the gold standard. This was simply a phenomenon 
arising out of the increased production of silver accompanied by a reduc-
tion of cost as the successive adoption by various countries of the gold stan-
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dard and the ban on the silver coining, which naturally brought a big 
change in the relation of supply and demand. The continued fall of the 
price of silver due to these factors works in the same way as when a silver-
standard country devaluates its currency continuously against a gold-stan-
dard country. The original capital, constituting one of the essential com-
ponents of the rate of exchange, meantime, is duly affected by such devalua-
tion, which, in turn, will unavoidably cause a decline of the rate of ex-
change. 
Next, a survey will be made of the enterprise activity in this period. 
The total amount of the incorporated capital in 1877 was ¥ 460,000, which 
recorded a steady rise as ¥ 890,000 in 1878, ¥ 1,100,000 in 1879-1880 and 
¥ 28,000,000 in 1881. However, the enterprises actually in oporation then 
were without exception on a small scale and were more or less commercial 
capital in nature. It is presumed that most of them engaged in specula-
tive transactions; this could be seen from the fact that the increase of the 
number of companies was at its highest in the period of 1880-1881, when 
the inflation was at its worst. It is a common phenomenon under inflation 
that, as it is fairly far advanced, capital will be allured more to such 
channels where invested capital circulates more quickly for profit than 
ordinary processes of production. This may be shown in the following 
formula: 
(1) G-W······p······W'-G' (acquisition of profit through processes of pr-
oduction. This is the formnla of industrial capital.) 
(2) G-W-G' (inflationary channels for quick acquisition of profit. The 
processes of production is lacking in this formula.) 
The latter formula, actually, shows the movement of commercial ca-
pital, and, if this comes to an extreme, trends will come up to the fore 
that profits are pursued through speculative dealings. 
Now, let us take up the marketable securities and the rate of interest. 
According to Table IV, the rate of interest registered a rise, while the 
prices of the marketable securities declined. With the Kyushu rebellion 
as a turning point, the issue of the inconvertible notes rose, which resulted 
in the virtual cutting down of the price standard, the rise of commodity 
priecs, an increase of the amount of nominal capital needed to maintain 
commercial and industrial activities on the same scale as before, an increase 
of the demand for the capital loaned to the banks and the rise of the rate 
of interest. As the speculative dealings inensified, as mentioned previously, 
demand for. capital for such purposes naturally mounted, which, again, 
brought about a rise in the rate of interest, which was a phenomenon to 
be easily expected. Further, it is well-known that the rate of interest and 
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the price of marketable securities usually fluctuate in a precisely opposite 
direction, and, it will be unnecesssry to dwell longer on this particular 
aspect. 
Table IV. 
, _______________ ~ ____ ~ ____ ~~ _____ , Lastly, a survey will be 
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: which shows an example of 
laborers in Tokyo, when com-
pared with the movement 
shown in the rise of the price 
of rice (refer Table II), will 
wages was greatly 
This is to say tha t 
amply show that the rise of 
out of proportion with a strikingly low rate of rise. 
the decline of substantial wages was drastic and preci-
pitous. 
The foregoing lines have, it is hoped, served to show in outlines the 
causes for the inflation and various phenomena seen under that inflation. 
In the lines that follow, various measures taken by the Government to cou-
nter such situation will be taken up for examination. 
Chapter 3. Measures Taken by the Government 
to Counter the Inflation. 
In a broad analysis, the Government resorted to five counter-measures, 
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most of which, however, resulted in failure becuase the Government started 
from a mistaken interpretation of the inflation. 
(I) Placing silver on sale. 
The rise of commodity prices always lagged behind the fluctuation 
seen in the market quotations of foreign silver. Opinion, thus, prevailed 
both in government, and private circles concerned that" in the years 1878 
and 1879 there was no fall in the price of paper notes nor was their 
amount issued excessively big. That there was an unbalance as against 
the price of silver was simply due to a rise in the latter." Under such 
interpretation, the Government authorities determined to take measures 
designed to curb the further rise of silver price, and, from about April 
and May in 1879, had the Second National and the Mitsui Banks place 
on market the silver currency amounting to more than ¥2,400,000 in value 
from the National Treasury. This made the silver price fall to Yen 1.102 
(June) from ¥ 1.247 (April). But, as the selling slightly slackened in July, 
it again beganto go up and was quoted at ¥ 1.435 in Ma Hh, 1880. The 
Government, then, in April and May, 1880, sold out more than ¥6,000,000 
-worth silver currency through the First National, the Second National 
and the Mitsui Banks, which made the price go down to ¥ 1.367 (June) from 
¥ 1.549 (April). An unfavorable balance in foreign trade worked to pull 
it up again, it being quoted at ¥ 1.489 in September. It should be noted 
that this measure failed to take due cognizance of the essential character 
of an inflation -an increased issuance of inconvertible paper notes led to 
the virtual cuting down of the price standard, which resulted in the rise 
of commodity prices and silver price-, and, by simply taking into conside-
ration the two consequences of cutting down of the price standard, i. e. the 
rise of the silver price and that of commodity prices, committed the mis-
take of taking one for a cause of the other, and, through a readjustment 
of these two, tried to curb the tendetcy of further rise in commodity 
prices. Thus, this particular measure, substantially, had nothing to do with 
the essential character of an inflation, and, consequently, had practically no 
chance of ever succeeding. The Government, eventually, abandoned it. 
(2) Establishment of a Foreign Silver Exchange-the Yokohama Specie 
Bank. 
The report to the then Premier drafted by Finance· Minister Shigenobu 
Okuma, as quoted earlier, proposing the inauguration of a foreign silver 
exchange, sought the causes for continued speculative dealings in foreign 
silver in the absence of such exchange, and, proposed that "a foreign 
silver exchange be inaugurated in Yokohama without delay," and predicted 
that, "once such be authorized officially by the Government, no further 
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bogus transactions, as alluded to previously, shall be allowed, the price 
being gradually restored to its natural level." The Government, with an 
aim to curbing the rise of silver price, eventually took steps to inaugurate 
a foreign silver exchange in Yokohama in February, 1879. The Yokohama 
Specie Bank, as one means taken by the Government for the pruposes of 
preventing rise of silver price, opened its doors to business in February, 
1880. That the Government took such a step was because it was under 
the belief that the shortage of foreign silver caused its price to go up, which, 
in turn, caused a difference with the price of silver notes. In other words, 
the founding of the foreign silver exchange or the Yokohama Specie Bank 
was a result of a mistake committed by the Government in grasping the 
essential identity of an inflation, as such was the case, also, in regard to 
the Government measures for placing silver on sale. It was only natural, 
then, that neither of these measures proved successful for the attainment 
of the original purposes. In addition to this, these policies could not be 
pursued steadfastly, examples of which could be found in various Govern-
ment measures taken relative to the exchange. 
(3) Restrictions imposed on dealings at the silver currency exchange or the 
stock exchange. 
In September, 1879, the Government authorized dealings in gold and 
silver at the stock exchanges in Tokyo and Osaka and, at the same time, 
ordered the Yokohama foreign silver exchange (Yokohama Yogin Torihikisyo) 
to be re-named as the Yokohama exchange (Yokohama Torihikisyo), where 
dealings not only in foreign silver but also in gold and silver currency 
were permitted. This was precisely in accordance with the original aims 
of establishing the exchange as a means of preventing the silver price from 
going up. In spite of this, the price of silver registered a further rise, 
reaching the level of ¥ 1.579 in April, 1880. Judging that the rise of the 
price was being caused by the speculative activity in the exchange, the 
Government, then, banned dealings in gold and silver currency. This was 
followed by a revision of the Act of Stock Exchanges, permitting transac-
tions in gold and silver currency again in May, periodical marketing of 
which was again prohibited during the same month. Towards the end of 
this year, the price of silver saw a further rise; opinion was raised within 
the Government circles that transactions in gold and silver currency should 
be absolutely banned, which, however, was not put into practice. The 
Government policy regarding the operation of the exchanges, thus, wave-
red greatly and never was fixed, and this, as has repeatedly been already 
pointed out, was due to the fact that the Government failed to see into 
the essential identity of the inflation. 
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(4) Encouragement of Industries: 
While all of these measures, as mentioned in the foregoing lines, aimed 
at curbing the inflation through suppressing the price of silver, the Govern-
ment further resorted to another policy, -which was through the promotion 
of industrial production-for the same purpose. It may be pointed out here 
that such a policy was based upon a theory as is related below. The rise 
of commodity prices was brought about by the rise of the price of foreign 
silver, which, in turn, was due to a shortage of the specie. The shortage 
of the specie, again, was the result of the imports exceding the exports, 
while such unfavorable balance of foreign trade could be traced to an un-
satisfactory industrial production at home. Hence, the need was apparent 
that domestic industires be encouraged for increased production. With this 
in view, the government took steps to loan to private industrialists the loans 
appropriated from its reserves, or, with the use of such funds, financed esta-
blishment of government-operated enterprises. A sum of ¥ 23,000,000 out 
of a total of ¥52,000,000 in reserve was defrayed for such purposes. Most 
of private industries thus subsidized by the government, however, had the 
misfortune of ending in a failure, with the result that most of the govern-
ment loans advanced could not be re-collected. The standpoint to curb an 
inflation through an increased production, true, carries an important phase 
directly in contact with its essential character. It is needless to say that 
an inflation should be interpreted in its relation to the re-productive stru-
cture of society, and, as far as it holds, it in not simply a problem of the 
process of circulation. However, overdue emphasis placed on this particular 
point will be liable to lead to an error. It is already well known that the 
necesqary amount of the circulation of money, provided that the velocity 
of circulation of money is constant, depends on the total amount" of the 
prices of commodities produced by a particular society. The question of 
production herewith will be summed up in the question of the value of 
commodities, which lies at the back of the volvme and price of such com-
modities. Therefore, in the opinion of the present writer, the question of 
production, as far as the theory of inflation is concerned, should be inter-
preted as a question related to the necessary amount of the circulation of 
money. It was precisely in this sense that mention was made in the fore-
going lines that such standpoint" carries an important phase." An infla-
tion, however, does not simply a question of such necessary amount of the 
circulation of money; it is caused when an increased issuance of paper 
l) the total amount bF the prices of commodities 
-=::f(price of a commodity x quantity of the commodity) 
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money not based on any value relations leads to an actual amount of its 
circulation in excess of the necessary amount of the circulation of money, 
entailing a virtual cutting down of the price standard. If this particular 
point is overlooked, no effort to increase industrial production, so long as 
the tendency toward increased issuance of paper money is not curbed, will 
suucceed in overcoming an inflation. 
(5) Curtailment of paper money issued. 
Before and after the political crisis of 1881, a marked difference is 
observable in the fundamental standpoint of the cause of inflation and the 
measures taken to counter it on the part of the government authorities. 
Prior to the political crisis in 1881, Finance Minister 0kuma and later, 
Councillor (Sangi) 0kuma and Finance Minister Sano were directly in charge 
of the situation, while Matsukata, as Finance Minister, was responsible 
after the political shift. Unable to understand correctly the factors causing 
an inflation, 0kuma and Sano tried to seek its causes in the shortage of 
the specie due to an unfavorable balance of foreign trade. Thus, the 
measures taken by them to counter the inflation, though they included a 
policy of curtailing the paper notes issued, lacked steadfastness, and it ap-
peared as if more emphasis was placed by them on the importation of 
foreign capital. The first policy taken by the then Finance Minister Oknma 
was based on the government decree No. 87 promulgated in connection 
with the redemption of the supplementary paper notes which were placed in 
circulation tat the time of the Kyiishii Rebellion in 1877. According to this 
decree, the redemption of these notes was to be completed by 1895 starting in 
1878 and it was hardly thinkable that this particular decree had deliberately 
been designed to fight the inflation. As the difference of price with the silver 
notes grew bigger, he took steps to publish in June, 1879 a special Bond 
Depreciating Program intended to curtail the period to eight years. How-
ever, business and industrial circles at this time were suffering from a 
shortage of money capital, and, seeking to find causes for the want of 
capital and the drastic rise of interest rate in the shortage of the currency 
in circulation, were clamoring for an increased issuance of paper hotes. 
In the face of this, Finance Minister 0kuma rapidly lost confidence in 
pushing ahead his policy. Then, 0kuma and Sano tried to raise a foreign 
loan amounting to ¥50,000,000 in 1880, with which to redeem the paper 
nutes issued; their plan, however, was not approved. The price of silver 
further continued to rise; the sale of silver Was suspended in September, 
1880,- incidentally, a series of policies which began from the sale of 
silver mentioned previonsly were all caried out by Mr. Okuma-and Sano-
which was followed by a revision of the Regulations for Sake Brewing Tax 
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and retrenchment of various government department expenditures. These, 
however, failed to stop the continued rise of the price of silver, which 
reached a maximum in April, 1881. Count Matsukata, who succeeded him 
as Finance Minister, under the conviction that the increased issuance of 
inconvertible notes caused the inflation and that the rise of commodity 
prices represented but a shadowy level void of substance, did his utmost 
to redeem the paper notes, which, eventually, successfully brought the 
rampant inflation under control. How this was achieved has been described 
elswhere, a repetition of which is dispensed with here. The only point 
worth attention in this regard, however, is the reason why the policy 
tilken by Count Matsukata was blessed with success. Needless to say, 
the first reason conceivable was to be found in the correct interpretation 
by Count Matsukata of the cause of the inflation. There was something 
mDre than this. An inflation, originally, represented a policy adopted by 
the Government. At the time when Count Matsukata took over the 
portfolio of Finance Minister, various contradictions inherent in such policy 
had been asserting themselves more or less markedly while objective condi-
tions enabling its eventual control possible were already forming. These 
sircumstances, combined, prompted the Count to resort to such measure 
and crowned him with success. An examination of this particular point 
will be made in the lines which follow. 
Chapter 4. Limits of the Inflation and its Control. 
It should be noted that the historical mission of the Meiji absolutist 
regime existed in the essential accumulation of capital and a forcible execu-
tion of the policy for the evolution of the feudalistic relationship of pro-
duction to a capitalistic one. The nucleus of the essential accumulation 
of capital lay in the eventual break-up of a society between the owner 
of productive means and the owner of laboring power as a marketable 
commodity. However, in the case of a backward country where the accu-
mulation of capital is still on a low level, in spite of the acute necessity 
felt for a speedy transition to a capitalistic production system, an accu-
mulation of capital in terms of money is predominantly needed in order 
that such productive means be concentrated in the hands of a particular 
groups of people. The successive measures taken by the government for 
the establishment of exchange banks and national banks and the revision 
of government regulations governing such national banks should, thus, be 
interpreted from this standpoint. As is well known, the movement of 
interest-bearing capital may be represented in the formula of G-G'. And, 
in this, "money, as capital, will become a marketable commodity," and 
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"without any intermediate process linking these both ends," will come to 
increase its value, which, in turn, will signify its own increase. In other 
words, most important points, in this connection, are that, as far as interest-
bearing capital is concerned, the money capital becomes a marketable 
commodity, that what bank capital loans is actually a capital in the form 
of money, and that interest-bearing capital, too, so long as it is capital, 
ought to effectuate the increase of its own value. In the initial stages of 
an inflation, it is noted with special emphasis that profit of an enterprise 
shows a marked increase, and, demand for capital due to an added acti-
vity in production and circulation and also for speculative fund will go 
up together, and it results in increasing the demand for loaned capital, 
increasing the interest rate, bringing along with it an added profit on the 
part of a bank. A comparison of the situation prior to the revision of the 
Bank Regulation in 1876 and that in 1879 shows that the number of na-
tional banks had increased by more than 38 times during this period, while 
the total amount of their capital had increased by more than 11 times, the 
reasons for which should be found in the circumstance as mentioned above. 
As the inflation advances further, however, g in the formula G' =G+ g, 
which stands for interest, has its substantial value gradually reduced in 
spite of the continued rise of the interest rate. Not only this but the bank 
will come to be ever threatened by a continued devaluation of money 
capital which it offers as a marketable commodity. In the face of such 
situation, the bank will have no other recourse in order to safeguard its 
own interests than to put limit to its loaning through an increased interest 
rate. This means, in essencce, that the policy to foster industries by ac-
cumulating money capital due to a low level of accumulated capital, faces 
a danger of collapsing. Whatever contradictions that are inherent in an 
inflation will here present themselves, which, as a natural sequence, sti-
mulates a requirement that the inflation be placed under cintrol. The 
statement attributed to Count Matsukata, referring to the evils of an infla-
tion to the effect that" an increased issuance of paper notes will inevitably 
induce an increased demand for currency, while as the interest rate will 
temporarily be reduced initially for their increased issuance, various indust-
rial enterprises will be given an impetus to grow in scale and scope. 
When these enterprises are half way in their expansion, they will unavoi-
dably face a drastic rise of commodity prices, which entails an unexpected 
expansion of their expenditures. Demand for debts will grow up in no 
time; interest rate will go up; enterprises will face the need of retrench-
ment and curtailment, which, eventually, results in the reduction of the 
national power", should be interpreted from this standpoint. Thus, it 
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would be presumed that at the time when Count Matsukata took over his 
office, the inflation, which had been so rampant, was already running out 
its race. What, then, was the objective situation, which at this time was 
shaping itself, that enabled a positive policy for placing the inflation under 
control? 
It has already been mentioned that the reduction of land taxes effected 
in 1877 and the subsequent inflation which began to show up from 1878 
worked for the benefit of land-owner classes. This was responsible for the 
fact that land-owners, who had previously willingly aligned themselves to 
the movement for popular democracy under the pressure of heavily-taxed 
destitute tenant classes, gradually lost their zeal and dropped out of the 
ranks. This trend eventually led to the disintegration of the Liberal party 
in 1884. This is to say, in other words, that the Meiji regime had to 
strengthen more its own class foundation in the turmoil of an inflation. 
On the other hand, it stands to record that small-scale landed farmers as 
well as destitute tenant farmers were mercilessly robbed of what they had 
possessed by the inflation. While those in possession of the compensationary 
debentures, i. e. erstwhile feudal lords and upper Samurai classes, were by 
degrees incorporated into the capitalistic system of production in the form 
of inauguration of national bonks, the lower Samurai classes, under the pr-
essure of the inflation, had to sell out whatever debentures they happened 
to pDssess at a disproportionately low rate and were finding their may 
down to the proletarian classes. To add up to this, the position of wor-
king people and salaried men worsened. Thus, a distinct differentiation 
of society into two major classes of privileged politician-businessmen, capi-
talist-bankers and landowners, on the one hand, and proletarians and des-
titute farmers, on the other was seen. Objectively, the inflation, thus, 
played the role to promote the essential accumulation of capital. The 
formation of two major social classes, on the other hand, gave the pros-
pects of subsequent integration of the vast industrial capital. The objective 
situation which earlier was alluded to as shaping itself, actually referred 
to such break-up into two distinct social classes. Thus, deadlock encoun-
tered by the inflationary pDlicies, on the one hand, and the gradual ripen-
ing of an objective situation, on the other, combined to make it impera-
tive that the inflation be overcome, and, they, in unison, rendered it uti-
mately possible. 
What has been said about the inflation in the early Meiji era may be 
summarized as follows. An inflation is predominantly an issue related to 
the process of circulation (Zirukulationsprozess), which entails issuance of 
paper notes without being backed by any value relations, their circulation 
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in excess of the necessary amount of the circulation of money decrease of 
gold amount represented by them, a virdual cutting down of the price 
standard and the nominal rise of commodity prices, and it should essen-
tially be understood as a question of the function of the money of account. 
An error committed in this connection, apparently, was fundamentally 
responsible for having reduced various measures taken by the Meiji regime 
to counter the inflation to mere caricature. It shonld further be fully 
comprehended that an inflation does never remain a question of currency 
but that it is more a question of policy. From this point of view, it may 
safely be said that the inflation in the early years of the Meiji era, as a 
policy, sucessfully played its role for stimulating an essential accumulation 
of capital and paving the way for the subsequent formation and expansion 
of industrial capital. 
